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Extractive Institutions in Non-Tradeable Industries 
Enrico Vanino1 and Stevan Lee2 
 
1. Introduction 
For policy purposes, we are interested in the hypothesis that to promote export competitiveness and 
create jobs, it is necessary to address major distortions to prices in non-tradeable sectors. Exports drive 
growth in developing countries, but evidence has shown how non-tradeable rather than manufacturing 
industries have been the bulk generator of employment in the last decades, accounting for almost 70% 
of total employment, and might be the motor of inclusive growth (Brooks, 2012).3 However, these 
sectors are particularly vulnerable to distortion from ³extractive institutions´, by which powerful groups 
generate or extract rents from economic activities and create costs for others, mainly because of the 
closed domestic nature of these sectors and the relatively inelastic demand for non-tradeable goods 
(Kahn and Jomo, 2000; Acemoglu, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Pritchett et al. 2017). 
The contribution of this study is to identify the impact of extractive institutions in non-tradeable sectors, 
specifically looking at the relative prices for non-tradeable goods. We implement a dynamic IV-GMM 
to examine the relationship between changes in LQVWLWXWLRQV¶quality and non-tradeable relative prices. 
By identifying these distortions we fill a gap in the current policy and academic discussions on 
institutions, growth and economic transformation. Our work contributes to the literature on 
³development without industrialization´ analysing growth in developing countries whose production is 
skewed to services, suggesting a strong relationship between tradeable competitiveness and non-
tradeable costs (Gollin et al. 2016; Glaeser and Henderson, 2017; Lall et al. 2017; Venables, 2017). 
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 Non-tradable goods are products and services not traded internationally. These include products whose producers and 
consumers are mainly located in the same local market, and whose trading costs prevent their export. Generally, if the price of 
the good is mainly set by local supply and demand, the item should be considered non-tradable (Jenkins et al, 2011). In this 
study we consider non-tradeable the electricity, gas, ZDWHUVXSSO\LQGXVWU\KRXVLQJDQGKRXVHKROGV¶VHUYLFHVVHFWRUV7KHVH
sectors are particularly closed to imports and foreign investment, especially in low-middle income countries where imports to 
such industries account for less than 10% of sectoral GDP (UN COMTRADE, 2017). 
Extractive institutions are likely to distort prices of non-tradeables disproportionately, with potential 
negative externalities for tradeable sectors. 
In addition, we contribute to the literature on institutions, market distortions and economic growth 
(Rodrik, 2004; Haltiwanger et al. 2013). Indeed, most of the previous empirical evidence has focused 
on the role played by institutions in shaping economic development and growth, rather than focusing 
on the possible distortive effect on prices (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et al. 2004). 
2. Data and Methodology 
We employ time series on prices in tradeable and non-tradeable sectors using consumer price indexes 
(CPIs) provided by the ILO for a sample of 88 developing countries between 2002 and 2014.4 We 
calculate the relative price for non-tradeables as the change in the non-tradeable CPI relative to the 
change in the general CPI. To measure institutional quality we rely on two databases provided by the 
World Bank and largely used in the previous literature, the ³World Governance IndicatorV´ and the 
³'RLQJ %XVLQHVV´ databases (William and Siddique, 2008; Alvarez et al. 2018).5 We use principal 
component analysis to create two indicators of institutions quality, one for each database, which 
statistically summarize the underlying data and weight each indicator according to its additional 
variability (Langbein and Knack, 2010). 
To estimate how an improvement in institutions and business regulations quality affects the growth of 
relative prices in non-tradeable sectors, we employ a dynamic two-step difference IV-GMM (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991), controlling for the instruments potential weakness and benchmarking it with an OLS 
model:  ?ܥܲܫ ?ܰ ௖ܶ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ?ܹܩܫ௖௧ ൅ ߚଶ ?ܧܦܤ௖௧ ൅ ߚଷ ? ௖ܷ௧ ൅ ߚସ ?ܫܯ ௖ܲ௧ ൅ ߚହ ?ܩܦ ௖ܲ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ ?ܱܲ ௖ܲ௧൅ ߚ଻ ?ܰܣܴܶܧ ௖ܵ௧ ൅ ݆௖ ൅ ݆௧ ൅ ߝ௖௧ 
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 The World Bank categorised in 2002 low (LIC) and low-middle income (LMIC) countries with an income per-capita below 
2,395 USD, 4,035 USD in 2014. Alternative sources of price data have been considered, however those were either limited to 
specific countries and industries or cross-sections for single years, thus not allowing a dynamic analysis. As a robustness test, 
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5
 The WGI database includes six dimensions of governance including accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption control. The EDB includes indicators on the easiness of starting a 
new business, getting construction permits, registering property rights, getting credit, pay taxes, trading across borders, 
enforcing contracts and resolve insolvencies. 
 ?ܥܲܫ ?ܰ ௖ܶ௧ is the change in the relative price of non-tradeables at time t in country c,  ?ܹܩܫ௖௧ the 
growth in the World Governance Index while  ?ܧܦܤ௖௧ the growth in the Ease of Doing Business Index. 
We control for unemployment  ? ௖ܷ௧, imports of services  ?ܫܯ ௖ܲ௧, GDP per capita  ?ܩܦ ௖ܲ௧, population 
growth  ?ܱܲ ௖ܲ௧, share of natural resources rents over GDP  ?ܰܣܴܶܧ ௖ܵ௧ and we include country ݆௖ and 
year fixed-effects ݆௧.6 As instruments we use infants¶ mortality rate, which has been found to be linked 
with democracy, political and institutional conditions, but not with prices (Zweifel and Navia, 2000; 
Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Shandra et al. 2004), as well as the potentially endogenous 
independent variables ܹܩܫ௖௧ and ܧܦܤ௖௧ lagged up to t-4. In addition we lag by one period all other 
control variables. 
3. Results  
In Table 1 we compare the results of the OLS and GMM estimations. Column 2 shows a negative 
relation between institutions quality and non-tradeable prices in LMICs, where a one standard deviation 
increase (0.29) in the WGI index is associated with a reduction by almost 1.8% in the relative price of 
non-tradeables, while one standard deviation increase in the EDB index (0.24) is related with a 3.64% 
reduction in the relative price of non-tradeables. These effects are relevant especially in LMICs where 
poorer business regulations might generate rents and the creation of monopolies. These results 
corroborate and generalize the country and sector-specific findings of the previous literature on rent 
generation in non-tradeable sectors, in particular regarding the relevance of business regulations and 
competition policies in promoting the provision of efficient non-tradeables, preventing the creation of 
oligopolies and the generation of rents (Love and Martinez-Peria, 2015; Rijkers et al. 2017).  
Figure 1 shows the heterogeneous effect of improvements in the WGI index across the distribution of 
the EDB and vice versa, suggesting in panel B that improvements in business regulations are 
particularly beneficial for countries with poorer governance institutions, while in panel A that 
governance enhancements reduce non-tradeable inflation in countries with already relatively stronger 
business regulations. Moreover, the negative relationship between WGI/EDB indexes and non-
                                               
6
 Summary statistics reported in Table A2 in the appendix. 
tradeable prices is particularly strong for countries with low resources rents intensities in panels C-D. 
Countries heavily dependent on natural resources rents show a positive relationship between institutions 
quality and non-tradeable prices, probably because of a ³Dutch disease´ effect where commodity 
exporting countries experience non-tradeable inflation despite improvement in their governance 
(Nkurunziza et al. 2017).7 
Table 1: Impact of institutions quality on the relative prices of non-tradeable goods. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IV-GMM OLS 
  General LMIC General LMIC 
WGI 0.0209 -0.0630*** -0.102 -0.111** 
  (0.0516) (0.0244) (0.168) (0.065) 
EDB -0.147*** -0.187*** 0.172 -0.192** 
  (0.0130) (0.0365) (0.110) (0.098) 
U 0.0788*** 0.540*** -0.0515 -0.0157 
  (0.0120) (0.0330) (0.0337) (0.0650) 
IMP -0.0316*** -0.0310*** -0.0148 -0.0178*** 
  (0.00666) (0.0058) (0.0193) (0.0002) 
GDP 0.110*** 0.0288 0.0398*** 0.0272 
  (0.0251) (0.0552) (0.0107) (0.0818) 
POP 0.639*** -0.388** 0.152 0.190 
  (0.0284) (0.187) (0.116) (0.249) 
NATRES -0.00386 -0.0292* -0.0249 -0.0204* 
  (0.0103) (0.0150) (0.0245) (0.0107) 
Observations 1,178 525 1,178 525 
No. Countries 149 88 149 88 
AR(2) 0.276 0.999 - - 
Hansen 0.158 0.998 - - 
Notes: Estimation based on ILO and WB data for the period 2002-2014. Estimators used are a first-difference panel OLS and IV-GMM with 
country and year fixed-effects. Instrumental variables used in the two-step difference *00LQFOXGHLQIDQWV¶PRUWDOLW\UDWHDQGWKHODJVRIWKH
WGI and EDB indexes up to t-4. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level reported in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: 
*** p<0.01, **<0.05, * p<0.1. 
4. Conclusions 
Non-tradeable sectors are particularly relevant for economic development and inclusiveness given the 
evidence that, even when growth is led by manufacturing exports, most jobs come from these industries. 
Our analysis shows how non-tradeable sectors are particularly vulnerable to distortions arising from 
extractive institutions. Countries interested in inclusive growth should take interest in the impact of 
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 Additional robustness tests reported in Tables A4-A8 in the appendix.  
institutions and pro-competitive business regulations on the performance of non-tradeable sectors, since 
these have direct employment implications and potential positive externalities both for domestic market 
and export-oriented tradeable industries. 
 
Figure 1: Impact of WGI, EDB and resources rents interactions on the prices of non-tradeables. 
Notes: Estimation based on ILO and WB data for the period 2002-2014 using an IV-GMM with country and year fixed-effects. Distribution 
of the WGI, EDB and natural resources rents intensity reported in quartiles from the bottom (1) to the top (4) quartiles. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
The supplementary materials include additional description of the data and further robustness 
tests of our main results. Table A.1 lists the countries included in our study and their income 
classification in 2002 and 2014 according to the World Bank, while Table A.2 presents a few 
descriptive statistics for the main variables included in the econometric analysis. Table A.3 
tests the results presented in Table 1 of the paper using the World Bank CPI data for the period 
2002-2011 instead of the ILO CPI data. Tables A.4 and A.5 control for multicollinearity, first 
by including separately the WGI and EDB variables, and secondly by including individually 
all the different components of the WGI and EDB indexes to show which are the most 
important factors related to the reductions in the relative non-tradeable prices. Table A.6 reports 
the results of the GMM estimations including up to 9 lags of the WGI and EDB variables, while 
Table A.7 reports the first-stage of the IV-GMM estimation. Finally, Table A.8 reports the 
comparison of the results in Table 1 benchmarked by both an OLS and an IV-OLS model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1: List of countries included in our study and income classification in 2002 and 2014. 
Country 2002 2014 Country 2002 2014 Country 2002 2014 Country 2002 2014 
Albania LM LM Germany H H Jordan LM UM Pakistan L LM 
United Arab Emirates H H Denmark H H Japan H H Panama UM UM 
Argentina UM UM Dominican Rep LM UM Kazakhstan LM UM Peru LM UM 
Armenia LM LM Algeria LM UM Kenya L L Philippines LM LM 
Australia H H Ecuador LM UM Kyrgyz Republic L L Papua New Guinea L LM 
Austria H H Egypt LM LM Cambodia L L Poland UM H 
Azerbaijan L UM Spain H H Korea, Rep. H H Portugal H H 
Burundi L L Estonia UM H Kuwait H H Paraguay LM LM 
Belgium H H Finland H H Lao PDR L LM Qatar H H 
Benin L L Fiji LM LM Sri Lanka LM LM Russia  LM UM 
Burkina Faso L L France H H Lesotho L LM Rwanda L L 
Bangladesh L L Gabon UM UM Lithuania UM UM Saudi Arabia UM H 
Bulgaria LM UM United Kingdom H H Luxembourg H H Senegal L LM 
Bahrain H H Georgia L LM Latvia UM UM Singapore H H 
Bahamas H H Ghana L LM Morocco LM LM Solomon Islands L LM 
Bosnia Herzegovina LM UM Guinea L L Madagascar L L El Salvador LM LM 
Belarus LM UM Gambia, The L L Maldives LM UM Serbia .. UM 
Belize UM LM Guinea-Bissau L L Mexico UM UM Slovak Republic UM H 
Bolivia LM LM Greece H H Macedonia LM UM Slovenia H H 
Brazil LM UM Guatemala LM LM Mali L L Sweden H H 
Brunei Darussalam H H Guyana LM LM Mongolia L LM Swaziland LM LM 
Botswana UM UM Hong Kong H H Mozambique L L Chad L L 
Central African Rep L L Honduras LM LM Mauritania L L Togo L L 
Canada H H Croatia UM H Mauritius UM UM Thailand LM UM 
Switzerland H H Haiti L L Malawi L L Trinidad & Tobago UM H 
Chile UM UM Hungary UM H Malaysia UM UM Tunisia LM UM 
China LM UM Indonesia L LM Namibia LM UM Turkey LM UM 
Côte d'Ivoire L LM India L LM Niger L L Uganda L L 
Cameroon L LM Ireland H H Nigeria L LM Uruguay UM UM 
Congo, Rep. L LM Iran LM UM Nicaragua L LM United States H H 
Colombia LM UM Iraq LM LM Netherlands H H Venezuela UM UM 
Cabo Verde LM LM Iceland H H Norway H H Yemen L LM 
Costa Rica UM UM Israel H H Nepal L L South Africa LM UM 
Cyprus H H Italy H H New Zealand H H Zambia L LM 
Czech Republic UM H Jamaica LM UM Oman UM H Zimbabwe L L 
Notes: Thresholds for 2002: Low-income country (L) below 735 USD; low-middle income country (LM) between 736 and 2,935 USD; upper-middle income 
country (UM) between 2,936 and 9,075 USD; high-income country (H) above 9,075 USD. Thresholds for 2014: Low-income country (L) below 1,025 USD; low-
middle income country (LM) between 1,026 and 4,035 USD; upper-middle income country (UM) between 4,036 and 12,475 USD; high-income country (H) above 
12,475 USD.  
 
 
 
Table A.2: Summary Statistics for the main variables included in the econometric analysis. 
  Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
CPI NT 1,178 1.290 1.418 -4.497 10.75 
WGI 1,178 0.243 2.120 -4.151 4.541 
EDB 1,178 59.19 13.70 27.21 87.52 
U 1,178 8.959 6.570 0.300 38.60 
IMP 1,178 23,800 54,600 0.206 444,000 
GDP 1,178 16,616 17,113 512.8 133,557 
POP 1,178 37.30 126.0 0.283 1,320 
NATRES 1,178 7.787 11.554 0.00 58.74 
MORT 1,178 26.90 26.63 1.71 116.2 
Notes: Statistics based on ILO and WB data for the period 2002-2014. CPI is the relative change in the price of non-tradeables over the general 
CPI; WGI the value of the World Governance Index; EDB the level of the Ease of Doing Business Index; U is the share of unemployment; 
IMP the value of services imports in USD millions; GDP is the GDP per capita in PPP; POP the level of population in millions; NATRES 
the share of natural resources rents over total GDP; MORT the infants mortality rate per 1,000 live births. 
Table A.3: Impact of institutions quality on the relative prices of non-tradeable goods - World Bank 
CPI Index. 
  (1) (2) 
  General LMIC 
WGI -0.0184*** -0.0426* 
  (0.00638) (0.0224) 
EDB -0.0684*** -0.0451*** 
  (0.00407) (0.00959) 
U 0.138*** 0.130*** 
  (0.00451) (0.0192) 
IMP -0.0141*** -0.0180*** 
  (0.00254) (0.00608) 
GDP 0.264*** 0.0762** 
  (0.0140) (0.0309) 
POP 0.110*** -0.234*** 
  (0.0171) (0.0486) 
NATRES -0.0187*** -0.000735 
  (0.00254) (0.00679) 
Observations 979 455 
No. Countries 138 82 
AR(2) 0.931 0.246 
Hansen 0.980 0.500 
 
Notes: Estimation based on WB data for the period 2002-2011. Estimators used are a first-difference panel OLS and IV-GMM with country 
and year fixed-effects. Instrumental variables used in the two-VWHSGLIIHUHQFH*00LQFOXGHLQIDQWV¶PRUWDOLW\UDWHDQGWKHODJVRIWKH:*,
and EDB indexes up to t-4. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level reported in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: *** 
p<0.01, **<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4: Impact of institutions quality on the relative prices of non-tradeable goods - Control for 
Multi-collinearity. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  General LMIC 
WGI 
-0.0895***   -0.0848** 
 
  (0.0311)   (0.0349) 
 
EDB 
 
-0.159*** 
 
-0.200*** 
  
 
(0.0233) 
 
(0.0242) 
U 0.0717*** 0.0712*** 0.565*** 0.682*** 
  (0.0273) (0.0213) (0.0796) (0.0259) 
IMP 
-0.0523*** -0.0357*** -0.0495*** -0.0349*** 
  (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0143) (0.00700) 
GDP 0.00529 0.226*** 0.0375 0.0817 
  (0.0497) (0.0406) (0.0791) (0.0649) 
POP 0.368*** 0.632*** -0.657*** -0.686*** 
  (0.0438) (0.0321) (0.165) (0.113) 
NATRES 0.0160 -0.0177 -0.0330 -0.0750*** 
  (0.0205) (0.0180) (0.0210) (0.0177) 
Observations 1,178 1,178 525 525 
No. Countries 149 149 88 88 
AR(2) 0.334 0.273 0.853 0.873 
Hansen 0.226 0.411 0.194 0.236 
Notes: Estimation based on ILO and WB data for the period 2002-2014. Estimator used is a IV-GMM with country and year fixed-effects. 
Instrumental variables used include infants¶ mortality rate, and the lags of the WGI and EDB indexes up to t-4. Robust standard errors clustered 
at the country-level reported in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, **<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.5: Impact of WGI and EDB indicators on the relative prices of non-tradeable goods. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
WGI 
Indicators 
Corruption 
Ctrl. 
Gov. 
Efficiency 
Political 
Stability 
Regulatory 
Quality Rule of Law 
Voice & 
Accountability 
coeff. -0.0568*** -0.0519*** -0.0401*** -0.0225 -0.0297*** -0.0427*** 
s.e. (0.011) (0.0116) (0.0054) (0.015) (0.0106) (0.0116) 
Observations 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 
No. Countries 149 149 149 149 149 149 
AR(2) 0.354 0.341 0.303 0.292 0.358 0.316 
Hansen 0.781 0.619 0.075 0.278 0.600 0.402 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EDB 
Indicators 
Start 
Business 
Construction 
Permits 
Property 
Rights Get Credit 
Investment 
Protection Taxation Trading 
Contract 
Enforcement Insolvencies 
coeff. -0.0014*** -0.0016*** -0.0013*** -0.0008*** 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0012*** -0.0029*** -0.0006*** 
s.e. (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Observations 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 
No. Countries 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
AR(2) 0.265 0.483 0.489 0.361 0.300 0.420 0.407 0.258 0.234 
Hansen 0.801 0.107 0.262 0.610 0.340 0.217 0.341 0.892 0.765 
Notes: Estimation based on ILO and WB data for the period 2002-2014. Estimator used is a IV-GMM with country and year fixed-effects. 
Instrumental variables used include infants¶ mortality rate, and the lags of the different WGI and EDB indicators up to t-4. Control variables 
included but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level reported in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: *** 
p<0.01, **<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.6: Impact of institutions quality on the relative prices of non-tradeable goods ± Additional 
lags included in the IV-GMM estimation. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 
WGI 
-0.0630*** -0.0481** -0.0355 -0.0434 0.0108 0.0205 
  (0.0244) (0.0234) (0.0272) (0.0304) (0.0261) (0.0240) 
EDB 
-0.147*** -0.167*** -0.168*** -0.143*** -0.153*** -0.165*** 
  (0.0130) (0.0155) (0.0130) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0201) 
U 0.0788*** 0.00939 0.0262*** 0.00855 -0.0211** 0.0198*** 
  (0.0120) (0.0106) (0.00994) (0.00742) (0.00877) (0.00643) 
IMP 
-0.0316*** -0.0250*** -0.0158** -0.0162*** -0.0301*** -0.0222*** 
  (0.00666) (0.00620) (0.00671) (0.00440) (0.00578) (0.00469) 
GDP 0.110*** 0.0749*** 0.00292 -0.00898 -0.00519 0.0289 
  (0.0251) (0.0219) (0.0203) (0.0157) (0.0171) (0.0178) 
POP 0.639*** 0.577*** 0.519*** 0.452*** 0.423*** 0.464*** 
  (0.0284) (0.0226) (0.0175) (0.0197) (0.0317) (0.0235) 
NATRES 
-0.00386 0.0204** 0.0188* 0.0462*** 0.0237*** 0.00299 
  (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.00968) (0.00939) (0.00682) (0.00672) 
Observations 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 
No. Countries 149 149 149 149 149 149 
AR(2) 0.276 0.779 0.695 0.666 0.666 0.672 
Hansen 0.158 0.218 0.732 0.990 0.989 0.991 
Notes: Estimation based on ILO and WB data for the period 2002-2014. Estimator used is a IV-GMM with country and year fixed-effects. 
Instrumental variables used include infants¶ mortality rate, and the lags of the WGI and EDB indexes up to t-10. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country-level reported in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, **<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.7: First-stage of the IV-GMM estimation. 
  (1) (2) 
  WGI EDB 
L1.WGI 0.727*** 0.118** 
  (0.0489) (0.0497) 
L2.WGI 0.0958* 0.0287 
  (0.0516) (0.0445) 
L3.WGI 0.0200 -0.000397 
  (0.0484) (0.0708) 
L4.WGI -0.0409 -0.0162 
  (0.0318) (0.0621) 
L1.EDB 0.0608* 0.720*** 
  (0.0340) (0.0550) 
L2.EDB -0.0103 0.000975 
  (0.0426) (0.0582) 
L3.EDB -0.0201 -0.0382 
  (0.0240) (0.0381) 
L4.EDB -0.0102 0.0409* 
  (0.0177) (0.0222) 
MORT -0.0322** -0.0250 
  (0.0169) (0.0453) 
L1.MORT -0.0770** 0.00225 
  (0.0336) (0.0304) 
L2.MORT 0.0620 -0.175*** 
  (0.0686) (0.0576) 
L3.MORT 0.0188 -0.165*** 
  (0.0420) (0.0617) 
L4.MORT -0.0441 -0.0927* 
  (0.0340) (0.0552) 
U -0.0132*** -0.00124 
  (0.00497) (0.00737) 
IMP 0.00387 0.0108 
  (0.00591) (0.00880) 
GDP 0.0386* 0.0578** 
  (0.0228) (0.0282) 
POP -0.0505 -0.102** 
  (0.0320) (0.0432) 
NATRES -0.00343 -0.0110 
  (0.00494) (0.00772) 
Observations 1,178 1,178 
No. Countries 149 149 
F-test 40.33 120.03 
Sanderson-Windmeijer 36.88 75.52 
Notes: Estimation based on ILO and WB data for the period 2002-2014. Estimator used is a IV-GMM with country and year fixed-effects. F-
test and Sanderson-Windmeijer test for the exogeneity and validity of the instruments are reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
country-level reported in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, **<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A.8: Impact of institutions quality on the relative prices of non-tradeable goods comparing 
GMM, OLS and IV-OLS. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IV-GMM OLS IV-OLS 
  General LMIC General LMIC General LMIC 
WGI 0.0209 -0.0630*** -0.102 -0.111** -0.174 -0.260** 
  (0.0516) (0.0244) (0.168) (0.065) (0.335) (0.137) 
EDB -0.147*** -0.187*** 0.172 -0.192** -0.222 -0.338* 
  (0.0130) (0.0365) (0.110) (0.098) (0.138) (0.191) 
U 0.0788*** 0.540*** -0.0515 -0.0157 -0.0408 0.0517 
  (0.0120) (0.0330) (0.0337) (0.0650) (0.0782) (0.114) 
IMP -0.0316*** -0.0310*** -0.0148 -0.0178*** -0.0149 -0.0150* 
  (0.00666) (0.00585) (0.0193) (0.0002) (0.00904) (0.00849) 
GDP 0.110*** 0.0288 0.0398*** 0.0272 0.667* 0.0774 
  (0.0251) (0.0552) (0.0107) (0.0818) (0.345) (0.363) 
POP 0.639*** -0.388** 0.152 0.190 0.127** -0.621 
  (0.0284) (0.187) (0.116) (0.249) (0.059) (3.556) 
NATRES -0.00386 -0.0292* -0.0249 -0.0204* -0.0594 -0.104** 
  (0.0103) (0.0150) (0.0245) (0.0107) (0.0661) (0.0426) 
Observations 1,178 525 1,178 525 1,178 525 
No. Countries 149 88 149 88 149 88 
AR(2) 0.276 0.999 - - - - 
Hansen 0.158 0.998 - - - - 
Notes: Estimation based on ILO and WB data for the period 2002-2014. Estimators used are a first-difference panel OLS, IV-OLS and IV-
GMM with country and year fixed-effects. Instrumental variables used in the two-VWHSGLIIHUHQFH*00LQFOXGHLQIDQWV¶mortality rate, and 
the lags of the WGI and EDB indexes up to t-4. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance levels: *** p<0.01, **<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
